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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ERNEST W. COWLEY and
C. FRANK COWLEY,
Plaintiffs and Appellants
RESPONDENTS
vs.

BRIEF

J. L. WATTERSON,
Defendant and Respondent
STATEMENT OF

FACTS

THE APPEAL in this case appears to be essentially
on questions of fact.

The evidence is conflicting in many

matters so that the defendant does not agree to the Statement of Facts by the plaintiff.
Some items are admitted. It is admitted that the land
in question is located approximately one mile west of Logan and is used to produce, what is commonly referred to,
as native or wild hay; the map prepared by the Surveyor
Moser is taken from the present ownership plat of Cache
County and illustrates the location of the plaintiff's property and the right of way of the Railroad Company. It is
likewise admitted that the Railroad was constructed across
the property in about the year 1912 or 1914 and that the
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right of way over the plaintiff's
condemnaticn proceedings.

pro~erty

was procured by

That during the irrigation

season there is ample water to irrigate these meadow
lands, also

defend:~Et's

lands, and prior to the cqnstruction

of the Railroad the springs herein referred to as Tarbet or
Bod:rero and Blue Springs were a part of the waters of
what is con:m.1only referred to as Swift Spring and Slough,
the waters of which were decreed to plaintiff and defendants predecessors in interest in what is commonly called
the Kimball Decree. (Tr. 147, 374) The construction of the
Railroad cut off the Blue and Tarbet Springs from the
balance of t?: e waters making up the Swift Spring and
Slough so that the waters on the South side of the tract
flowed down in the old channel and the Tarbet and Blue
Springs flowed down the ditch in the north barrow pit of
the Railroad right of way.

Prior to the construction of

the Railroad the defendant's predecessors in interest took
the water out west of the plaintiff's land where it coursed
North from the Slough over and across the I. P. Stewart
property, novv South of the Railroad, and on over North
over the east end of the Stewart property North of the
Railroad on to what was then the Hebaus property now the
property of the defendant. (Tr. 89, 246, 350, 351)

The

general slope of the land as to the North of the Railroad is
to the west and to the north. (Tr. 318)

The barrow pit is

en the south side of the plaintiff's land and there is a ditch
on the north of plaintiff's land which was cleaned as a
drain ditch as well as an irrigation ditch and this ditch
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converges with the water down the barrow pit at the west
tip of plaintiff's land and runs down the barrow pit to the
west approximately 150 feet to where it runs under the
Railroad track at Point 9 on the map. (Tr. 277-8) (For
photograph of this pipe referred to repeatedly in the record as a culvert, see Defendant's Exhibit 14) When there
is enough water reaching Point 9 to fill the culvert half full,
the water will run on further down the barrow pit to where
it intersects the old ditch running across the Stewart land
to the North over to irrigate approximately 80 acres of defendant's land. (Tr. 311) A dam at the end of this pipe has
been the chief matter at issue in this case. Defendant also
takes irrigation water from the Swift Slough lower down to
irrigate the west part of his property. (Tr. 310) There is
considerable evidence about the irrigation of these western lands but we contend none of this evidence is material
to this case.
Plaintiff used boards across the end of the pipe to divert the water for several years and later used a steel dam
that covered the lower half of the pipe which was removed
by the plaintiff (Tr. 116) and produced by him at the defendant's request and offered as an exhibit in this case.
All tfie otl:er facts recited by the appellant are controverted, but it is contended by defendant that the great preponderance of the evidence support the following:
Plaintiffs pastured their cattle on the Railroad right
of way and they traveled down the tract to where it cours-
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ed through the defendant's land and the cattle passed
through the Railroad fence and trespassed and damaged
the defendant's crops.

Defendant told plaintiff he must

take care of his cattle and a few days later this action
was started. (Tr. 295) It is not too easy to understand the
action because the physical facts do not bear out the claim
of tt e plaintiff that a dam over a major part of the pipe
will back up the waters and flood plaintiff's' land.

The

engineer's survey does not substantiate his claim. His survey (Tr 133-4) establishes the top of the pipe elevation
93.64 as against grotmd elevation at bridge 93.94. (Tr 179)

The waters when the pipe is running full will not back onto
plaintiffs' land (Tr 179-83) and the evidence as to the fact
of the flooding was so conflicting that the court himself
suggested he believed an experiment should be tried to deternline that issue. (Tr 359).
This action was begun on July 23, 1953 when it is alleged the water had been backed up and damaged the
crops.

The next day the defendant took two neighbors as

witnesses, Mr. Reese and Mr. Ricks. (Tr 250-258; 258268).

Ttey went over the plaintiffs' premises and discovered
that their meadow was all being irrigated, but upon examination, none of the water was coming from the barrow
L;it cr south ditch (Tr 252, 260) but was con1ing from the
East where the springs, 4 to 6 c.f.s., were diverted from
the ditch to the east of plaintiffs' property where it spread
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north and south across the entire meadow of the neighbor
Johnson and down across the entire 55 acres belonging to
the plaintiffs. It required boots to inspect the property.
These meadows are common to this country and the
customary way to grow crops is to pretty much keep the
water on them all summer and then turn it off when they
are ready to cut

t1~e

hay.

Dr. Stewart testified that was

the custom of plaintiffs for many years. ( (Tr 24 7).
Pictures taken of the meadow claimed to be damaged
taken just before the crops were taken show that the irrigated part of the meadow (Defendant's Ex. 12) wa,s well
up to the knees of the witness while the higher ground (Defendant's Ex. 11) was dry and the grass much thiner and
only about half as high. Defendant's Exhibit 4 is a photograph of the hay cut on the alleged damaged farm where
the evidence is in direct conflict as to whether this is an
average or good crop. (Tr 288).
At or near the Point 9 the plaintiffs maintain a bridge
or crossing over the barrow pit which is approximately
75 rods east of the triangular tip of the plaintiffs' lands.
Defendant's exhibits 6, 9, 16 and 17 are photographs of
this bridge looking both up and down the stream. Defendant's 16 was taken the same day as defendant's 14 and conclusively demonstrates that there was a good fall to the
West from this bridge at the time when the pipe was running more than half full.

The same condition existed at

this bridge when tt. e trial test was viewed by the court
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when the pipe was running within 5 or 6 inches of the
top. (Tr 405) Defendant testified that was as high as the
water got when he had tte tin over the pipe. (Tr 296).
The ditch on the north was cleaned at the joint expense of plaintiffs, defendant and the neighbor Parley
Reese on the north and was approximately 19 inches below the surface of the ground on the south so that the waters running to the ncrthwest off the plaintiffs' meadows
drained into that ditch and off to the west. (Tr 279).
The plaintiffs did use the bridge at Point 9 above referred to also as a dam.

They would put small timbers

down into the n1ud on the upper end of the bridge and then
haul in a load of straw and manure and throw in above
these timbers and the water would wash this against the
upper end of the bridge and back the water up to the east
and it would then flood out over the north side of the center and west part of the plaintiffs land and some of it
would find its way back into the barrow pit to tl:e west,
but since the slope of the land was principally to the west
and north, water that really got very far out on plaintiffs
land would flow across to the northwest.
There is a direct conflict in the evidence as to whether
the pipe was dammed to the top in June and July 1953 and
as to the length of time it was there. Defendant conceded
that when the plaintiff took his half dam and defendant
could not find it he did put a piece of tin across the entire
uipe but he and his witnesses claimed the water simply
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ran on down to the west and did not back up to the top of
the pipe. (Tr 296) Plaintiff claimed he saw it once when it
was an inch or two over the top of the pipe. (Tr 129).
The first day of the trial at noon at the suggestion of
the defendant and the court went down to view the premises. (Tr 58, 108) This was in February and the pipe was
tten running a little more than half full.

There was no

flooding but plaintiff complained that this was not a fair
demonstration because there was no irrigation going on
down on the defendant's property.
At the close of the trial with the evidence as to flooding, as well as on other subjects so hopelessly in conflict,
the trial judge suggested that he view the premises on June
14, when conditions as to flooding would be more nearly

like those complained of to better settle the item of damages. (Tr 359) .
Judge Jones did visit the premises on June 14, 1954,
which was during the irrigation season.

Plaintiff com-

plained bitterly then that defendant had cleaned his ditches
and lowered the bottom of the ditch as much as nine inches
(Tr 371-3) and said this was not a fair demonstration. The
judge then directed the defendant to completely cover the
end of the pipe (culvert) (Tr 411) and a few days later the
judge again viewed the premises with the pipe completely
covered, at which time, the water was flowing about 5 or 6
inches below the top of the pipe. (Tr 405) There was no
flooding on any of these occasions.

And the court held
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against tl:e plaintiffs on the question of backing the water
up and flooding the land except for the one item that it
might have been possible before the ditch was cleaned that
some slight flooding could have resulted in 1953, and solely upon that ground allowed the plaintiff $50.00 damages.
Because of the small amount involved and the conflict in
the evidence, there was no cross appeal, although the trial
court indicated he thought there might be one. At page 443
of the transcript the court stated:
"THE COURT: Let's see; I want to include in the
findings that subject to this one time, this June,
1953, incident: there's been no flooding. I'm finding against you on that."
ARGUMENT
Counsel for appellant opened his brief with the statement, "This is a suit for an injunction."

This case was

commenced in July and by fall of that year a second amended complaint had been filed, and the case did not come on
for trial until February.

At the beginning of the trial

the court directed an inquiry to counsel whether this was
a water case with incidental damages or a damage suit,
(Tr 54) to which Mr. Nelson replied:

"It's a damage case."
The Court: "A damage case?"
Mr. Nelsen: "Yes. There's no question about water
rights that I can see. It is primarily a damage case."
There followed considerable discussion that indicated
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that plaintiff by his amended complaint was trying to
establish an exclusive right to the use of the barrow pit
to carry irrigation water and therefore that they wanted
to prevent the defendant from using the ditch in the barrow pit to convey his irrigation water and it may be assumed that if there is a question presented on this issue by
the appeal it is still our position, it s a legal action to establish a right to carry water in this ditch or barrow pit, but
whether legal or equitable, in view of the conflict· in the
testimony and the fact that the court reached the conclusion there would be no flooding where the pipe was not
dammed higher than to force water to flow five or six
inches below the top of the pipe in question, after conducting repeated experiments on the property this court will
not disturb these findings unless the court find from
the record they are clearly against the weight of the evidence.
In the case of Dahnken vs. George Romney & Sons
Co., 111 Utah 4 71, 184 Pac. 2nd, 211, which was a case involving an easement by prescription, the court says:
"However, there are in this case no equitable
issues; therefore, it must be considered as an action at law. Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Utah 10,
994, P 2d 862; Norback v. Board of Directors, 84
Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 339. Our review in law cases is
limited to the determination of whether or not
there is competent evidence to support the judgment of the trial court."
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Counsel in the first sentence of this brief refers to this
as an injunction suit.

This appears to be a hint that this

court should -review the disputed evidence and make new
findings based on the testimony of witness favorable to
the plaintiffs.

No authorities are cited for the proposi-

tion and in fact the law of this state is well settled that
this court will not ordinarily disturb findings of fact of a
trial by the court where the evidence is in conflict even in
an equity case:
Wilcox vs. Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 Pac. 2nd,
1; Stanley vs. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 Pac. 2nd
465; :Millard vs. Parry et al, 2 Utah 2nd 217, 271
Pac. 2nd, 852.
In the latter case the court states the rule as follows:
"We think these findings of the trial court are
sustained by competent evidence and that they
should not be disturbed. It is a rule of this court
that even in an equity case in which it has the
right to review the evidence and makes its own
findings, it will not disturb a finding of the trial
court based upon conflcting evidence unless the evidence clearly preponderates against the finding."
ASSIGNMENT 1 AND 2
The four assignments of error all seem to raise merely the question as to whether there is sufficient evidence
to support the findings of the court.
The first assignment is that there is no evidence to
support the finding in 7 that the defendant and his pre-
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decessors in interest used their irrigation waters from a
ditch taking off from the Swift Slough and coursing north
through the Stewart property to the defendant's property
and after the construction of the Railroad making the diversion from the ditch in the barrow pit into the same
ditch.

It is the defendant's contention that the overwhelming weight of the evidence sustains these findings.

In the

first place the court's repeated viewing of the premises
showed the old markings of the old abandoned ditch. All
that the trial court saw might not appear in the record
but it was referred to on a number of occasions.

At Tr

89 the plaintiff himself started to describe the Hebaus
ditch but was interrupted by his counsel.

He apparently

did not dispute the ditch being there, but did testify that
for some years Hebaus did not use the water.

Incidently

that is not important because there is no issue of abandonment of a water right in this case.
Dr. I. P. Stewart, owner of the land where the ditch
runs over to the defendant's property, a man past his
eighties, testified that the Hebaus ditch had been there for
many years, although he would not try to give the exact
number (Tr 246).

The defendant testified that Mr. He-

baus was watering there through the portions of those
ditches north of the track in 1921 when he went over there
with his father. (Tr 276 and 285)

He testified Hebaus

raised grain and alfalfa on this same land he now irrigates
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and the ditches to the land are substantially the same, but
the old ditches followed around the high places and now he
has leveled the land so the ditches are now straight. (Tr
277).
The plaintiff, on cross examination, admitted that
when the Railroad was build the barrow pit on the north
side of the Railroad was a substitute for carrying water
that had been flowing to the south and coming down the
old slough. (Tr 350-51) It is true that the plaintiff attempted to call this barrow pit a drain, but that is not
very convincing when the slope of the country is to the
north and west and they used this big dam by the bridge to
water along the south edge of the meadow.
This has reference to the water from the Tarbet or
Blue Spring, also referred to as the Bodrero Spring, which
arises north of the Railroad; there were other sources arising south of the Railroad. (Tr 311)

The whole theory of

the trial was that the Railroad made it necessary to change
the method of irrigating the plaintiffs' property north of
the track, and this also went for the irrigation of the property of the defendant north of the track irrigated from the
old diversion point at Point "B" on the map. It is not disputed that the defendant's lower or westerly lands continued to be irrigated through the ditch designated as diverted
from the Slough at Point "B" on the map.
After the case had been tried and closed the Railroad
abandoned their right of way and conveyed by Quit Claim

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
Deed the same to the respective land owners.

Plaintiff

then filed a supplemental pleading in which they sought a
judgment herein allowing them to turn the waters south
across the tracks where it went before the Railroad was
constructed.

The defendant replied setting up that the

old ditch from the Swift Slough over to their ditch on the
north side of the Railroad had been abandoned and not
used for more than 40 years. The plaintiffs wanted to restore the water to be turned back to the old Swift Slough,
but on inquiry from the court they were not willing to
agree to restore the abandoned ditch from the Swift Slough
to defendant's ditch, (Tr 367 -68) and at Tr 433:
"THE COURT: In other words you make no
tender now to provide another route?"
"MR. YOUNG: No."
There was a rather extended conference between counsel and the court about the matter.

No one suggested the

old ditch had not been there but the question was raised
that the plaintiffs did not own the land upon which the old
ditch existed south of the Railroad.
Mr. Waterson testified that he remembered where the
old ditch took off from the Swift Slough, that there was
still some marks of the old ditch left; (Tr 402) and then
that ditch took off where Cowleys had an old ditch (approximately Point "B" on the map) and ran for a ways
through the Cowley or Smart place down to the Stewart
property and then north to the defendant's property. (Tr
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403-4)

He also testified the old ditch had never been used

south of· the Railroad since that time but they had always
used the ditch on the north of the Railroad.
The trial court was not impressed apparently with this
application to turn the water back to the south and entered judgment accordingly.
What has already been said in effect also answers the
Assignment No.2 as to the manner of the dam on the pipe.
The plaintiff admitted he took the half dam used by the
defendant for several years and produced it after cross examination at the trial.

The defendant admitted that he

placed a piece of tin that covered the entire end of the
pipe for a day or two in June, 1953, but it was his claim that
there was never enough water to reach the top of the culvert.

This was contradicted by plaintiff.

The court re-

solved it in favor of the plaintiff and allowed damages for
this occurance. Plaintiff conceded he did not want to raise
the water to the top of the pipe and much of the latter part
of the hearing was taken up by the plaintiff contending the
ditch to the west had been lowered so the water would not
go to the top of the pipe, in which case it was physically a
fact that it would not flood plaintiffs' land.

Defendant

offered to consent to a provision in the decree that he had
no right to raise the water to the top of the pipe and the
court offered to give the plaintiff an injunction against
raising the water above a point 6 inches below the top of the
pipe, but plaintiffs declined the injunction, apparently upon
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the theory it would do them no good since the ditch had
been lowered and would not now flood their land. (Tr
445-47).
ASSIGNMENT NO. 3 FINDING NO. 10
The third assignment is that the court erred in holding that the use of the ditch in the barrow pit was adverse
and under claim of right.

It may be true that the plaintiff

was not asked to give his conclusion, that he used it adversly and under claim of right, etc.

Bqt the facts are

clearly established that he did so use it continuously. That
he had no other way to get the water to use his land and
whenever 1vir. Cowley asserted a right to remove the dam
from the pipe, Mr. Watterson, in no uncertain terms, announced his claim of rights; (Tr 284) and that Mr. Cowley
knew defendant was claiming the right, was testified to by
Cmvley when he stated that when he observed Watterson
approaching the culvert, he, Cowley, got on his horse and
rode away. (Tr 108). It is interesting to here remark that
when Cowley told Watterson he was flooding Cowley's
land, Watterson asked him to show him where it was flooding over Cowley's land but Cowley declined to do so. (Tr
283). In fact no one testified anywhere in this record that
they observed the water flooding out of the barrow pit although plaintiff did testify the water did back up and flood
an entire 20 acres.
That the defendant and his predecessors in interest
acquired an easement against the Railroad Company in the
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barrow pit for carrying his water by prescription, is well
settled in this state.

Holm vs. Davis, 41 Utah 200, 125

Pacific 403. This is the case that established the law for
this state for canals and ditches in the following language:
"If such were not the law, then in this state,
in view of the arid character of the land embraced
within its borders, but few irrigating ditches could
now be maintained. This is apparent to all, for the
reason that in many if not most instances such
ditches were at least in part constructed over lands
owned by others either with the express or implied
permission or consent of the owners thereof. If the
owners of lands over which ditches have been thus
constructed can now claim, as is claimed by respondent, that the owners and users of those ditches
have acquired no right to maintain them for the
reason that the ditches or canals were in fact constructed with the consent of the original owners of
the lands, and hence the ditch owners are mere
licensees, and their ditches, flumes, and canals are
maintained and used only by the sufferance or indulgence of the landowners, then the law has proved
to be a mere delusion and a snare. In settling and
reclaiming the arid lands much that in early days
was deemed entirely worthless has now acquired
considerable value. Over such lands miles of
ditches, flumes, and canals were constructed with
either the express or implied consent of the owners thereof. Can such owners, after a lapse of all
these years, now treat the owners of the ditches as
mere trespassers? We think not. Upon the other
hand, we are of the opinion that, although a canal,
ditch, or flume may have been constructed by a
person on or over lands owned by another with the
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consent or permission of such other owner, yet, if
the owner of the canal, ditch, or flume, or his assignee, has used and maintained the same in the
same manner as if the same were constructed over
his own lands, and where such use and maintenance
has continued uninterruptedly and under claim of
right for more than twenty years, in such event the
owner of the ditch has acquired a right to use and
maintain tr.e same perpetually as an easement."
"The fact, therefore, that the canal was on the
land and was being used for the purposes aforesaid
was notice to the respondent that it was a structure
of a permanent character used for purposes permanent in their nature, and hence he purchased the
land subject to the rights of the owner of the canal.
If the right to use the same, therefore, had ripened
into a prescriptive right by the lapse of time and
the character of its use, respondent purchased and
holds the land subject to appellant's right to maintain and use the canal for tl:!e purposes for which it
was constructed, maintained, and used from its inception.''
The case has often been cited for the proposition that
in cases where the easement has been used for 20 years as
though it was the property of the user it is presumed to
be adverse and the burden is upon the owner of the seruient estate to prove the use was by consent.

There is no

evidence that this use in this case was by the consent of
the Railroad as a mere temporary license.
The case of Zollinger vs. Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 Pac.
2nd 714, applied the above law to a right of way for a
i'oadway. This is the case frequently cited for the proposition that adverse use means use "against" the owner of
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the servient estate rather than "under" such owner. The
court quotes from Arrwrican Jurisprudence on Easements
and then says:
"We think the better rule is that described as
the prevailing rule in the above quotation. That is,
where a claimant has shovm an open and continuous use of the land for the prescriptive period (20
years in Utah) the use will be presumed to have
been against the owner and the owner of the servient estate to prevent the prescriptive easement
from arising has the burden of showing that the
use was under him instead of against him."
The court then holds that the Frank case does not
come within the rule that "the road was opened by the
landowner for his own use," in which case the burden as
to consent is different.
There is no question of the Railroad building this ditch
in the barrow pit for its own use.

It was constructed so

that it would carry off the water that had formerly crossed over where the railroad was built and used by the irrigators to irrigate their lands in lieu of the old ditch. The
Railroad had no interest in the water for railroad purposes.
Dahnken vs. Romney, 111 Utah 471, 184 Pac. 2nd 211,
Utah 1947, is a later Utah case quoting the above rules
from the Frank case and applying them to the use of right
of way.
The rule that the burden is upon the claimant to show
his use was expressly adverse in cases where the ditch was
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constructed by the owner of the land for its own use applied in the case cited by appellant of Griffiths vs. Archibald (by a divided court), 2 Utah 2nd, 293, 272, Pac. 2nd
586 was not applied in the Frank case and is not applicable
in

t~:e

case at bar.

Board of Directors of Turlock Irrigation District vs.
City of Ceres, (Calif. 1953) 254 Pac. 2nd 907, is a typical
case sustaining an easement in an open ditch. In that case
the court, quoting other California cases, said:
"Accordingly, it has been held in this state that
where an open and uninterrupted use of easement
fer a sufficient length of time to create the presumption of a grant is shown, the law will presume
the elements of hostile intent, and that the use is
adverse and under a claim of right. Franz c. Mendonca, 131 Cal. 205, 63 P. 361; Fleming v. Howard,
150 Cal. 28, 87 P. 908; Clarke v. Clarke, 133 Cal.
6677, 66 P. 10. If the other party relies upon the
fact that these acts were permissive or in the nature of a license, or merely given as a matter of accommodation, it is incumbent upon him to rebut
the presumption of a non-appearing grant. Otherwise the presumption stands as sufficient proof and
establishes the right."
If there should be some doubt about the adverse char-

acter of the defendant's use of this ditch, that would not
be a reversible error in this case because the judgment
does not rely entirely on an easement by adverse use. The
old ditch was cut off by the Railroad Company and a new
one provided by them, and this new one was used by the
defendant and his predecessors in interest for approximate-
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ly 40 years until this controversy arose and the trial court.
in rendering his decision, announced that it made little
difference on what ground the right to use the ditch was
founded whether by exchange, adverse use, or estoppel;
(Tr 435) the defendant under the circumstances is clearly
entitled to use the ditch to convey his decreed water. There
was no showing of any facts which would legally deprive
the defendant of ditch rights in which to convey -his water
decreed to his predecessors in interest and used by them
for so many years. It is true the plaintiff in a sort of lefthanded manner attempted to testify that Hebaus did not
use the water for some years, but he was so indefinite in
his testimony as to time and amount, or as to opportunity
to observe the facts, that it could not possibly be stretched
into a finding that the water rights had been legally abandoned.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES
The fourth assignment seems to be an argument that
the court should have awarded more damages. We believe
this subject has already been fully covered.

The almost

conclusive evidence in this case was to the effect that the
water would not run out of the barrow pit onto plaintiffs'
lands as a result of placing the partial dam over the pipe.
'rhe preponderance of evidence was likewise well established that when the ditch was cleaned out, (lowered, as
described by plaintiff), he would not be flooded and counsel admitted an injunction against him would do no good.
(Tr 4--! 5)

The evidence being in conflict, the court should
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not disturb the judgment for damages. The defendant did
not appeal from the judgment for damages in the interest
of ending this long drawn out litigation.
CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted, that the defendant is the
owner of his decreed water rights, which in no way interfere with the water rights of the plaintiffs; that the acquiring of the easement to use the barrow pit is good and
valid on all three theories of, exchange, adverse use, and
estoppel; these rights were acquired against the Railroad
who changed the old irrigation system when they constructed the railroad; tl:e plaintiffs are in no better position than the railroad by reason of recently acquiring a
quit claim deed from the Railroad.
They refused to restore the old system which the
Railroad would have had to do, to avoid the easement on
the right of way.

It is not conceded they would have a

right to do that without the consent of the defendant.
Plaintiff has no valid theory of any kind to interfere with
defendant's water rights which were acquired entirely independent of the plaintiffs, and which plaintiffs have no
right to confiscate or destroy, and under these circumstances, the judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PRESTON & HARRIS,

Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent
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